The Hungarian and Turkish governments have recently implemented national insurance systems to transfer risks from floods and earthquakes, respectively, from households to public insurance pools. To date, neither system has met the expectations of the respective governments in terms of insurance uptake and political support. Insurance experts and government officials, who designed the Hungarian flood insurance legislation, only partly took account of recommendations by Hungarian stakeholders, who participated in a study carried out by IIASA, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Stockholm University. The study, which is described in this paper, implemented a model-based participatory process for designing a nation-wide flood insurance pool with a focus on the highly vulnerable Upper Tisza region in northeastern Hungary. This process stands in sharp contrast to the expert design of the Hungarian flood insurance system and the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP).
Introduction
One of the more controversial issues in countries highly exposed to disasters throughout the world is the respective roles of the government and the private market in preventing disaster losses and providing post-disaster assistance to flood victims. Economists view private responsibility for disaster risks as important for providing market incentives for individual lossprevention measures and to discourage development in high-risk regions, but the attribution of responsibility invokes fundamental questions of equity and social solidarity in responding to extreme circumstances, especially in poor and vulnerable regions. How much should persons living in non-risk areas and taxpayers contribute to preventing losses and compensating victims in vulnerable communities, and to what extent should those living or locating in high-risk areas bear the burden to encourage them to relocate or take loss-reduction measures? Experts, alone, cannot decide on these value-laden questions, but they require consideration in a broadly based democratic process that takes account of the conflicting views of what is a fair and effective insurance/solidarity system.
The drawbacks of relying solely on an expert-driven process for designing a national insurance pool have become apparent in Hungary and Turkey, where national insurance pools have recently been put into place. In Hungary, the uptake is far lower than expected and needed for the viability of the system. In Turkey, a recent governmental decree implementing the Turkish Catastrophe
Insurance Pool (TCIP) may be jeopardized by the reluctance of the Turkish parliament to legislate its continuation. The TCIP was an initiative of the Turkish government and the World Bank. The recent Hungarian insurance system has passed the Hungarian parliament, but the details were negotiated between the government and the insurance companies without the direct involvement of other stakeholders.
A pilot study carried out by IIASA with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and
Stockholm University 1 developed and tested a model-assisted, citizen-participatory procedure for designing a disaster reduction and insurance system. The focus was on the vulnerable Upper Tisza river region in northeastern Hungary. Renn et al. (1995) define public participation as "…forums of exchange that are organised for the purpose of facilitating communication between 1 The study was funded by the Swedish FORMAS.
government, citizens, stakeholders and interest groups, and businesses regarding a specific issue or problem" (p.2). In this paper we describe a participatory process that combines stakeholder interviews, a public questionnaire and a stakeholder workshop. A challenge for this process was to identify the conflicting perspectives and preferred policy directions for flood risk management held by the stakeholders, and more concretely to identify a politically viable policy path for a nation-wide, public-private insurance/compensation system (see Linnerooth-Bayer and Vári, forthcoming) . A unique feature of this process was a computer simulation model that illustrated the outcomes of the competing policy measures suggested by the stakeholders for reducing and sharing flood losses.
The pilot "Tisza study" was a success in that the stakeholders, who held strongly competing views of the flood risk pooling issue and its resolution, reached a consensus on a way forward. The stakeholder consensus differed importantly from that legislated by their parliament, and the Hungarian system -like its Turkish counterpart -has not received wide-scale public support. The Hungarian stakeholders agreed on a radical change from current practices, and only households with partial insurance cover would be eligible for post-disaster government assistance. They were unanimously opposed to mandatory insurance policies, which they viewed as a tax, and most stakeholders opposed risk-based premiums in poor regions opting instead for social solidarity (similar to the French insurance pool). These results contrast with the recent and controversial Turkish insurance pool. Of course, the Hungarian results cannot be transplanted to Turkey, but the political difficulties encountered by the TCIP raise the question whether a stakeholder participatory process, by informing the Turkish government and World Bank experts, might have avoided the current parliamentary stalemate?
After describing the flood risk problem in Hungary and specifically in the Upper Tisza river basin, we report results from the stakeholder interviews and nation-wide public survey. We then describe the catastrophe/policy model that simulated the distribution of future flood losses among the flood-basin residents, the government and insurers based on policy options that emerged from the stakeholder and public views. Armed with this model, the active stakeholders were revisited, which resulted in a revised set of three policy paths. Communities in the Upper Tisza region, and especially the high-risk areas near the Tisza River and its tributaries, are among the poorest in Hungary. Among the less qualified Roma population, the rate of unemployment in the region is very high, and agriculture by itself cannot support the local population. Riverine floods and inland waters have aggravated this situation considerably. There are communities, for instance, where free seed is distributed, but the residents are unwilling to sow mainly on account of the flood risk (Horváth, et al., 2001 ).
More positively, the area has a large and undeveloped potential for recreation, tourism, as well as nature conservation. There are pristine, almost untouched areas surrounding the meandering Tisza River, and its flood plain is sprinkled with old villages, traditional farms and historic buildings. Tourism was on the rise until 2000, when the area was stigmatized by a cyanide spill into the Szamos and Tisza rivers caused by the breakage of a tailings impoundment maintained by the AURUL Australian-Romanian joint venture mining company in northwestern Romania. Until this episode, water sports had developed intensively in the area; however, infrastructure supporting these sports remains underdeveloped, and there is large uncertainty about the future of the region with regard to tourism. stakeholders who are actively involved in and informed of the policy issues. These included twenty-four persons representing central, regional and local government agencies, farmers and entrepreneurs, NGO activists and insurance companies (Vári, 2001) . From these interviews, three prototypical flood-policy strategies emerged: state protection, individual responsibility, and holistic development of the region. (Stripple, 1998) .
While the individualistic view of flood risk management has been conspicuously absent from the mainstream policy discourse in Hungary, it is beginning to assert itself as Hungary enters the global marketplace and as government authorities recognize that they cannot continue massive public support programs. Budget austerity is thus forcing a partly reluctant government to switch towards more individual responsibility and "borrow" the market discourse that dominates the discussion in countries such as the United States and Great Britain. If uninsured disaster victims are guaranteed grants that enable them to continue to rebuild their property in hazard-prone areas, and more people build in those areas, taxpayers will be subject to increasingly larger expenditures for bailing out victims of future disasters. This moral hazard argument led the authors of a recent book, suggesting reforms to the U.S. natural disaster program, to argue for making private responsibility and insurance a cornerstone of catastrophic risk management (Kunreuther and Roth, 1998) .
The policy path emphasizing individual-responsibility can be justified on what at first appears to be an efficiency argument. With increased emphasis on incentives promoting lossreducing measures, everyone stands to gain: the taxpayers because of decreased demand for postdisaster aid and the Tisza residents if they are compensated for their loss-reduction expenses. The
Hungarians stakeholders, however, were reluctant to accept this Pareto efficiency argument. They saw few realistic measures local residents can take to reduce flood damages. Besides switching to more flood-resistant crops or abandoning agriculture altogether in favor of small handicrafts like rug weaving, the only remaining option is to leave the area. The relocation strategy is often advocated in wealthy countries, but it is problematic in Hungary where more than 50 per cent of the territory is at risk to flooding. As some stakeholders point out, the poor residents can only relocate to the cities increasing urban problems and resulting in the abandonment of historic villages.
Holistic development:
The third view promotes the ecological preservation of the area and egalitarian policies towards the poor, including subsidized programs to help farmers change landuse practices, the re-naturalization of the river by removing levees in some areas and the provision of infrastructure for soft tourism. These voices are strongly opposed to levees and other structural flood protection measures that, they claim, only push the risks downstream and endanger ecosystems. Fairness in this line of argument stands in opposition to the paternalistic fairness of the hierarchical discourse and the efficiency arguments of the individualist.
Ecosystems should have standing in the policy debate, and the very poor should be given priority in a kind of equality for all. Commercial insurers are regarded with suspicion since risk transfer
should not be an issue in an ecologically and socially just society.
These three perspectives -state protection, individual responsibility, and holistic development -form the contested policy terrain in Hungary. Each discourse constructs the problem and solutions in a way that reinforces the underlying worldview. Within this struggle, institutions and individuals may argue for the same policy, but for different reasons and based on different claims of fairness, which is a core concept behind the search for viable policy paths.
Round Two: The Public Survey
Based on the stakeholder interviews, a questionnaire with face-to-face interviews was administered to 400 persons in Hungary. The purpose was to elicit public stakeholder views on Hungary's options for reducing flood risks and providing assistance to victims. Four separate locations in Hungary were chosen in order to include stakeholders at high risk to flooding in both rural and urban areas, as well as urban and rural stakeholders who subsidize those living in highrisk areas through their tax and insurance payments. The sample size in each area was 100.
Settlements in rural areas were chosen randomly, and the number of participants was determined according to population size. The sample was selected to be representative in terms of gender and age for each region. For more details on the survey, see Vári , et al. (2003) .
The public survey confirmed that when it comes to floods the majority of Hungarians continue to view their world as it has been, that is, with a paternalistic state taking the main responsibility for their well-being. The main causes of flooding were seen as lack of maintenance of the levees, clearing of large forest areas in the catchment area and insufficient height and strength of the levees. Significantly, the least important cause was attributed to the local people taking insufficient preventive measures or building in flood-risk areas. At the same time, a third of the respondents blamed the authorities for having issued building permits in areas with high inundation risk. In mitigating the risks, low rankings were given to measures such as financial incentives, including risk-based insurance premiums, to encourage inhabitants to migrate out of high-risk areas, the introduction of alternative agricultural practices and re-naturalization of parts of the river. These results confirm the findings of the stakeholder interviews, that a majority of Hungarians tend to blame their government or neighboring countries for escalating flood losses, and few appear to hold those living and working in the high-risk areas as contributing substantially to this escalation.
Along this same perspective, responses strongly indicate that responsibility should be mainly in the hands of the central government rather than in the hands of property owners living in high-risk areas. In terms of responsibility the central government was ranked in first or second place (of four alternatives) by 92 percent of the respondents, the neighboring countries by 51 percent, the municipalities by 49 percent and the property owners by only 10 percent of the respondents. Corresponding to the view that the central government is mainly responsible for flood losses, a large majority of the respondents would fully or partially support Hungary's generous public compensation system. Importantly, however, an equally large majority was, at the same time, sympathetic with switching to more individual responsibility, meaning that many persons are in favor of both state protectionism and individual responsibility. Indeed, later questions show a great deal of support for a joint public-private insurance system for Hungary.
What motivates Hungarians to express such strong solidarity with flood victims?
Considering Hungary's history of government protection against flooding, it is not surprising that half (51%) of the respondents justify financial assistance to flood victims on claim that flood protection is the responsibility of the government and thus flooding is the fault of the government. If the river overflows the levees and floods the villages, the government is to blame since it has not built the levees strong or high enough. Alternatively, about a quarter of the respondents (26%) justify victim relief on the grounds that the government has always provided compensation, and a fifth (19%) justified financial support to the victims on the solidarity principle. This strong majority does not mean that there are no contending views in Hungary. A small but important minority of respondents is not in favor of compensating flood victims.
Among the cons, the respondents differentially thought that compensation is too costly for the taxpayers, or that it often goes to the wealthy or that compensation discourages people from purchasing insurance.
This plurality of views was apparent throughout the survey results. For example, there were mixed views on whether households in low-risk areas would be willing to pay higher flood insurance premiums to subsidize the premiums of those in poor, high-risk areas. As shown in 
Round three: Designing a national insurance program
The challenge for this pilot study was to develop a citizen participatory process that can accommodate the different perspectives and articulate a way forward. Ideally the process would lead to a flood insurance program that is compatible with the Hungarian legal, economic and political context and is viewed as efficient and fair by the stakeholders. Following the first two information-gathering rounds (the stakeholder interviews and public questionnaire), the research team proposed three policy paths or options that appeared consistent with the majority and minority views of the stakeholders and that were compatible with the political and institutional setting. These options took account of (1) the apparent widespread stakeholder support for continuing large government involvement in a national insurance program with post-disaster relief to flood victims; and (2) the simultaneous endorsement of introducing limited individual responsibility and insurance. The three policy options for a nation-wide public/private insurance system are shown in Figure 3 and described below:
• Option A continues current practices by combining extensive government post-disaster relief with voluntary, flat-rate (cross-subsidized) insurance;
• Option B places more responsibility on households living in high-risk areas to reduce their risks and purchase insurance. The government thus compensates victims by a lesser amount (perhaps only assuring their subsistence), and the public role is supplemented by two insurance layers: voluntary (but bundled) private insurance based on a flat-rate premium and, if a household wishes greater coverage, voluntary, risk-based insurance (this option was suggested in the World Bank report, see Halcrow, 1999).
• Option C is notably similar to the TCIP in that it reduces the role of private insurers with the creation of a fully public, but privately administered, insurance system (government disaster fund) financed by mandatory contributions from all property owners throughout Hungary. Unlike the TCIP, however, the Hungarian system contributions would not be based on flood risks, and the government would subsidise insurance premiums for lowincome households.
Round 4: Revising the policy options with support from a flood risk policy model
To demonstrate the financial consequences of the three pooling options (A, B and C in Figure 3 ) a flood risk policy model was developed for a pilot area in the Upper Tisza region in collaboration with VITUKI Consult (Brouwers, 2002; Ekenberg, et al., 2002; Ermolieva, 2002 , Galambos et al., 2001 Hansson, et al., 2001) . Depending on the option chosen, the aim of the model was to simulate the incidence of future flood losses on three key stakeholder groups: flood victims in the pilot basin, the insurance companies and the central government. The simulation model generated a probabilistic distribution of future flood losses in the pilot basin over a tenyear horizon, and illustrated the effects of this distribution given selected policy interventions. It consisted of four modules: (1) a one-dimensional, hydrological model of the river based on probabilistic input of water levels at the source, (2) a GIS-based flood model with values for residential properties, industry and crops in the pilot area, (3) an inundation or flood-loss model with property vulnerabilities and (4) a policy module that illustrated the effects of policy changes.
Modules 1-3 integrated assessments of the probability of the peril (high water) in the selected geographic region, the probability of levee failure or over-topping of the levee, the vulnerability of the properties concerned and the potential financial loss. The policy module simulated the effects of selected insurance-pool options on the profits of insurers, on the government budget and on those living in the pilot basin.
The model was designed to be as realistic as possible given available data and knowledge, but it was not presented to the stakeholders as full reality. Ravetz (2003) suggests that models be take the form of subsidies for pre-disaster loss reduction and insurance was a breakthrough in the stakeholder process. Indeed, across-the-board government relief might mean that households with insurance actually receive more that 100 percent of their damages, which was rejected by several stakeholders as unfair. This combination of government relief through a market mechanism, which would also appeal to social justice, was a first hint at a consensus policy package. including the local mayor, a resident of a non-risk area, the leader of a local environmental group, officials of the regional water management authority and the national authority for disaster management, and a representative of a major international brokerage firm. Unfortunately, the representative from the Hungarian insurance association was not able to attend (because of a lastminute invitation to attend a meeting on this topic with government representatives).
Figure 3: Insurance Program Options
The workshop was a forum for stakeholders to argue their policy positions and consider the arguments of the other participants, what theorists refer to as deliberation (Elster, 1998 , Rearon, 1998 Habermas, 1984) . The idea was to explore the terrain where citizens can agree on a policy direction, but for different reasons. This may or may not exist, but by exploring this terrain, deliberation and citizen participation can be an effective means of formulating citizen grievances, ideas and views and feeding them into the policy process (Renn and Webler, 1995) .
The moderated workshop began with a discussion on flood risk management issues in the region followed by the introduction of the three revised options shown in Figure 3 . The policy model showed simulation results of how these options distribute flood losses among the three stakeholder groups. The participants were asked to choose their preferred insurance policy option, and they were given time to change the option of their choice in any way to correspond more closely with their view of an efficient, fair and workable system. The participants were then grouped according to the option chosen and asked to negotiate a common view in their subgroup 
Consensus Option
• Government compensation only to insured households;
• A private insurance system with -bundled or separate policies for all types of natural disaster risks, -covering approximately 50% of the damage, and -voluntary, flat-rate premiums;
• Government subsidies for poor households up to 100% of premium;
This consensus is a radical departure from current practice insofar as the government compensates victims only if they have purchased partial cover from private insurers. As shown on Figure 3 , the Hungarian stakeholders supported a layer of government compensation as well as a voluntary, private system with substantial cross subsidies or solidarity among premium payers.
This latter feature is characteristic of the French national insurance system (Linnerooth-Bayer, et al., 2001) . In contrast to the French system, however, the Hungarian taxpayer will play no role in guaranteeing the solvency of private insurers by offering public reinsurance. A public guarantee is also not necessary since the private insurers can collect premiums that allow them to purchase reinsurance on the private market.
At least one caveat is in order. The solution on which the stakeholders decided would probably not have been endorsed by insurance companies, as it would have required them to offer greatly expanded cover at flat-based rates. The simulation model shows that insurers could expect a net loss with the consensus option (see Figure 4) . No high-level representative from the insurance industry was present at the final stakeholder workshop due, as we have already mentioned, to a last-minute cancellation. In a follow-up interview, we learned that the representative of insurance industry had not been able to make it to the meeting, as he had been expected in the Prime
Minister's office to negotiate directly with government representatives.
As a result of these negotiations, the Hungarian government decided upon a novel flood insurance program. According to the new legislation, the government will fully underwrite flood insurance in high-risk areas, and taxpayers will provide a backup if the premium pool is insufficient to cover claims. Consistent with the insurers' perspective, and in direct contradiction to the results of the stakeholder compromise, insurance premiums will be risk-based. Moreover, the premiums of poor households will only be subsidized up to 30 percent.
The outcome of this new law is disappointing. As of September 2004, only 159 households had purchased flood insurance policies (Várkonyi, 2004) . The Achilles heel of the new system seems to be that poor households will only receive a 30% subsidy for their private, risk-based insurance premiums. Our study strongly suggests that this will not encourage many poor households in risky areas, such as the Tisza region, to buy insurance. If so, then the next major floods will significantly harm and threaten the most vulnerable Hungarians. Given that the great majority of Hungarians still feel that the government should be responsible for flood prevention and compensation, it would not be unlikely that a public outcry would follow the floods, perhaps forcing the government to abandon its plans and compensate all flood victims.
Then, a lose-lose scenario would have unfolded: one in which the Hungarian government would have to spend large sums (both in the short and long term), while poor Hungarians would be left at the mercy of the weather gods for the foreseeable future.
Comparing the stakeholder consensus with the Turkish system
The Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), which was designed by World Bank experts together with officials from the Turkish treasury, is the first of its kind for an emerging economy country (see Gurenko, 2004; Balamir, 2002; Andersen, 2001) . Earthquake vulnerability has increased in Turkey mainly due to increased urbanization, faulty land use and construction, inadequate infrastructure and environmental degradation. Recent estimates suggest a yearly probability of 0.02 of a major earthquake in Istanbul, which is estimated to result in 30 to 40 thousand deaths and damage or destroy up to 400,000 buildings (Erdik, 2000) . Like in Hungary, the government has traditionally assumed the main financial responsibility for replacing private homes and other buildings destroyed in earthquakes. This practice has given homeowners little reason to purchase private insurance, and has also reduced incentives for building or retrofitting the existing building stock to meet standards, especially on the part of absentee property owners.
Finally, if property owners expect government assistance after disasters strike, this will encourage further development in disaster-prone areas.
Designers of the TCIP attempted to solve the fundamental problem -non-affordability of earthquake insurance in poor countries -by offering limited cover and by transferring some of the risk out of the country with World Bank support. As shown on Figure 3 , the World Bank will finance two layers of risk by means of a contingent credit facility with highly favorable terms.
In contrast to the consensus view of Hungarian stakeholder, which rejected mandatory insurance, a government decree in Turkey has made earthquake insurance policies obligatory for all property owners. Also, in contrast to the Hungarian consensus, the Turkish policy holders will pay a risk-based premium based on their risk zone, the construction of their property and risk reducing measures to a privately administered, public fund. On one point, the TCIP is in full agreement with the Hungarian consensus: only persons holding insurance policies will be eligible for additional government assistance after a disaster.
With risk-based pricing and no subsidies for policy holders, how is the TCIP affordable to poor households in high-risk areas? The World Bank experts explain its affordability based on two provisions: First, the subsidized reinsurance has an effect on price. Second, all households outside of municipalities (which are the poor rural households) are exempt from purchasing insurance, and the government will provide post-disaster assistance (Gurenko, 2004) . Except for these provisions, however, there is no solidarity in the system. This stands in contrast to most other systems. For example, the French all-hazards insurance program deliberately incorporates national solidarity through taxpayer involvement as well as through rejecting risk-based premiums. The program is reinsured through a public administered fund, the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR). If this fund is insufficient, taxpayers will be called upon to contribute. The
French recognize that the system provides disincentives for individuals and local communities to take risk-reduction measures. A recent and imaginative decree to counter this problem sets a deductible that increases with the number of disasters in the same area.
Even the US has an explicit policy of offering additional public assistance to insured disaster victims, as well as generally assisting uninsured victims. Many critics of the Turkish insurance pool doubted whether the government could uphold its resolve not to assist uninsured victims after a major earthquake. Their doubts were confirmed when the government offered generous compensation to uninsured victims of a recent earthquake in central Turkey.
To date, the penetration of earthquake insurance in Turkey is steady at about 3 million policies, representing about 22% of dwellings. The goal of the TCIP is to increase cover to 60%
by 2008, but many observers are skeptical if this goal can be reached, or even if the system is viable. The TCIP was implemented through a temporary governmental decree, and the Turkish parliament must pass follow up legislation to make this a mandatory program. To date, the parliament has not passed this legislation, which appears to be politically unpopular. We can only speculate that parliamentarians are concerned about mandatory insurance and also the lack of solidarity in the system. A stakeholder process might have flagged these difficulties before implementation of the TCIP.
Conclusions
For the Hungarian pilot stakeholder study, the final solution is not as important as the demonstration of a participatory, deliberative process that respects and builds on different stakeholder views and achieves consensus on a policy path. Starting with a very broad survey of views, interests and perspectives, the range of policy options was narrowed and refined through iterative interactions with stakeholders, who were knowledgeable, influential, and representative of different worldviews and perspectives. This iterative interaction with the stakeholders profited from the flood risk policy model, which simulated the effects of selected insurance-pool options on the profits of insurers, on the government budget and on those living in the pilot basin.
The process gradually moved from a contested terrain characterized by arguably nonviable policy solutions to increasingly viable options, culminating at the stakeholder workshop with agreement on a single policy recommendation. This agreement was achieved through a process of deliberation and argumentation. The arguments appeared to be based on different ideas of what is a fair insurance program, and also quite significantly on pragmatic considerations as well as economic interests. Importantly, many participants transcended their own economic interests to argue for one or the other concept of a fair program. One of the more significant findings of the public survey was that over thirty percent of the respondents living in high and dry areas were, nonetheless, willing to purchase flood insurance at rates that assured subsidies to those living in risk areas. Another significant finding was the almost unanimous agreement that the government should assist poor inhabitants living in flood-risk areas, and a milestone in achieving a consensus was the eventual recognition by the key stakeholders that this assistance need not be in the form of direct compensation or rebuilding houses. Rather, it could take the form of a pre-disaster policy, namely subsidizing insurance payments of poor households.
The policy recommendations from the stakeholder process were only partly heeded in recent Hungarian legislation for a national flood insurance system. According to the new system, the government fully underwrites flood insurance in high-risk areas, and taxpayers provide a backup if the premium pool is insufficient to cover claims. Consistent with the insurers' perspective, and in direct contradiction to the results of the stakeholder compromise, insurance premiums will be risk-based. Moreover, the premiums of poor households will only be subsidized up to 30 percent. To date, the purchase of flood insurance in high-risk areas is disappointingly low.
A main similarity with the TCIP and the Hungarian stakeholder consensus is that the central governments in both countries will reduce their fiscal responsibilities since they will be obligated to compensate earthquake/flood victims only if they have insurance. This is a major break from traditional practices in both countries, and some question its political feasibility. The important differences are twofold: First, in contrast to Turkey, disaster insurance in Hungary as proposed by the stakeholders would not be mandatory. In fact, all the stakeholders opposed obligatory insurance as a tax, although the practice of bundling flood cover with property insurance that is mandatory for a mortgage has already led to a very high uptake of insurance in Hungary. As a second contrast to Turkey, insurance payments in Hungary would not be risk based, and in a further show of social solidarity the government would provide subsidies to poor households for purchasing private insurance.
While economists view this finding as inefficient and ultimately leading to higher economic losses, their concern with distorted prices and mis-placed incentives may be less appropriate for developing countries. Whereas risk-based premiums are viewed as essential in wealthy countries to avoid subsidies to large-scale and expensive development in high-risk areas, for example, the coast of Florida, the loss-reduction measures that poor farmers can take in the Tisza region are limited and may not increase substantially with the incentives imposed by riskbased pricing of insurance. Moreover, the main concern is not that expensive development will move into the Tisza area, but that the poor farmers will leave and seek non-existent jobs in the cities. In the case of poor countries, it may be prudent to follow the U.K.'s example by beginning with subsidized insurance premiums and gradually moving to risk-based policies as the region and country develops.
The Hungarian stakeholder consensus based on only nine workshop participants clearly cannot claim to be representative of the full policy terrain in Hungary; in fact, the insurance company voice was under represented at the workshop. The purpose of deliberative stakeholder processes is not to replace representative democracy, but to sensitize political representatives and policy makers to the diverse constructions of the problem and its solutions, and to explore the terrain for agreement. While the results of the Hungarian process cannot be transplanted to Turkey, they do raise the question whether a stakeholder process in Turkey, where the stakeholders are informed by a seismic catastrophe model, might have flagged the difficulties now apparent with legislating a continuation of the program.
